



Lorenzo Hervás

Documentos de trabajo

Fundamentos del Lenguaje

Foundations of Language

Fondements du Langage

Sprachgrundlagen

Número 2

Marzo de 2011

ISSN 1988-8465

THEORY OF LANGUAGE AND GENERAL LINGUISTICS. ON THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODEL "FROM SPEAKING TO LINGUISTIC SYSTEMS"
(*"DESDE EL HABLAR A LAS LENGUAS"*)

Valerio Báez San José

Marciana Loma-Osorio Fontecha

Guillermo Fernández Rodríguez-Escalona

UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III

Cada autor agradecería que se le hicieran llegar – 1) en escrito firmado con fotocopia del DNI adjunta y 2) en soporte informático– puntualizaciones, precisiones o comentarios sobre el contenido del artículo y, en posteriores versiones (electrónicas o impresas) de este trabajo, se compromete a citar esas aportaciones o, en su caso, proponer a un comité de redacción independiente su publicación total o parcial dentro de esta misma colección. Dirección Postal:

Universidad Carlos III, c/ Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe (España).

E-mail: hervas.ling@uc3m.es

THEORY OF LANGUAGE AND GENERAL LINGUISTICS. ON THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODEL "FROM SPEAKING TO LINGUISTIC SYSTEMS"
("DESDE EL HABLAR A LAS LENGUAS")¹

Valerio Báez San José

Marciana Loma-Osorio Fontecha

Guillermo Fernández Rodríguez-Escalona

UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID

ABSTRACT

The present article tries to delimit the concepts of theory of language and general linguistics as well as to establish their place within the theory of knowledge. Theory of language itself is a deductive construct which supplies both universal concepts and modes of speaking whereas general linguistics acts inductively by formulating and verifying general hypotheses. Theory of language is not part of general linguistics; instead, being a prior knowledge to the latter, it is framed within the philosophy of science.

Based on Vico's and Dilthey's theories, the authors propound general linguistics as a cultural science or a human science (*Geisteswissenschaft*) as compared to natural sciences and auxiliary sciences. The object of general linguistics is a product of the human spirit and is mainly based on the relationships of meaning and sense explained from an opposite perspective. If the evolution of linguistic thought is examined, one can clearly observe the consequences that confusing the object of general linguistics with that of natural sciences, and of confusing the explanations of general linguistics and natural sciences, have had on the intellectual currents and schools of the last century.

Key Words: THEORY OF LANGUAGE, LINGUISTICS, NATURAL / AUXILIARY / CULTURAL SCIENCES, CIRCLE OF UNDERSTANDING, WORLDVIEW, SYNCHRONY / DIACHRONY.

1 M. Loma-Osorio Fontecha has translated this article from Spanish into English. The three above-mentioned authors have also reviewed the meaning of the whole paper. They would all like to thank Ms Veronica Mayer, M.A. candidate at Columbia University, New York, for the final linguistic review of the article.

RESUMEN

Este trabajo pretende delimitar los conceptos *Teoría del Lenguaje* y *Lingüística General* y establecer su lugar dentro de la Teoría de las Ciencias. La *Teoría del Lenguaje* es una construcción deductiva que provee de conceptos y modos universales sobre el hablar, mientras que la *Lingüística General* actúa inductivamente formulando y verificando hipótesis de carácter general. La *Teoría del Lenguaje* no forma parte de la *Lingüística General*, sino que, siendo un saber previo a ésta, se encuadra dentro de la *Filosofía de las Ciencias*.

Tomando como base el pensamiento de Vico y de Dilthey, se propone una *Lingüística General* como *Ciencia de la Cultura* o del espíritu (*Geisteswissenschaft*), frente a las *Ciencias de la Naturaleza* y las *Ciencias Auxiliares*. Su objeto es producto del espíritu humano y tiene como base predominantemente las relaciones de significado y sentido, explicadas de manera opositiva. Si examinamos el devenir del pensamiento lingüístico, se muestran las consecuencias que ha tenido, en las corrientes y escuelas lingüísticas del último siglo, el hecho de confundir: 1) el objeto de la *Lingüística General* con los objetos de las *Ciencias de la Naturaleza*, y 2) las explicaciones de la primera con las explicaciones causales, propias de las *Ciencias de la Naturaleza*.

Palabras clave: TEORÍA DEL LENGUAJE, LINGÜÍSTICA, CIENCIAS DE LA NATURALEZA/AUXILIARES/DE LA CULTURA, CÍRCULO EN LA COMPRENSIÓN, COSMOVISIÓN, SINCRONÍA/DIACRONÍA.

Der Mensch spricht nicht etwa nur in Wachvollzug seines Daseins, sondern ebenso auch in Traumvollzug. Er spricht nicht dann und wann, sondern stets. Stets aber nicht nur dann, wenn er seine Rede verlauten lässt, sondern er spricht im Wachen und Träumen auch dann, wenn er kein Wort verlauten lässt. In Wachvollzug seines Daseins lässt er insbesondere dann kein Wort verlauten, wenn er der verlautenden Rede eines anderen schweigend zuhört oder wenn er Geschriebenes schweigend liest. Das legt die Vermutung nahe, dass wir nur deshalb auch im schweigenden Zuhören und Lesen sprechen, weil wir uns darin mit gesprochener und geschriebener Sprache verstehend befassen. Man möchte daher meinen, wir sprechen dann nicht, wenn wir weder Worte verlauten lassen noch uns gesprochener und geschriebener verstehend zuwenden, sondern uns schweigsam einer Arbeit oder einfachen Verrichtung widmen oder aber von solchen Tätigkeiten ausruhen und der Muße pflegen. Stattdessen sprechen wir auch in diesen Daseinssituationen. Der Mensch spricht immer und in allen Feldern seines Daseins, wenn auch die Weisen seines Sprechens nicht einförmig, sondern mannigfaltig sind. Dass wir in allen Vollzugsweisen unseres Daseins sprechen –auch da wo wir es gewöhnlich nicht vermuten– deutet darauf hin, dass Sprechen in diesem weiten und umfassenden Sinne uns natürlich ist. Was uns natürlich ist, gehört zu unserer Natur, zu unserem Wesen, zum Wesen des Menschen. Was zum Wesen des Menschen gehört, bestimmt ihn von Grund auf, kann nicht erst das Ergebnis eines Willensaktes sein, sondern bestimmt ihn schon vor jedem Willensakt. Mit all dem ist jetzt nur darauf hingewiesen, wie das Sprechen und die Sprache das Selbst- und Weltverständnis des Menschen wesensmäßig bestimmt. Offen bleibt noch, was denn das Sprachliche in allen Vollzugsweisen des Selbst- und Weltverständnisses ist.

MARTIN HEIDEGGER

1. THEORY OF LANGUAGE AND GENERAL LINGUISTICS.

If speaking is all that the above-cited philosopher, M. Heidegger, shows and suggests it to be, there is not a harder task than speaking of speaking (*el hablar*). This is the reason why, before beginning any interpretation about of the definition of speaking (*el hablar*) as "our ability

to communicate with someone intentionally in an articulate manner", we intend to clearly delineate the notions of "theory of language" and "general linguistics" as a prior necessary foundation² to the study of any historical language. From our point of view, these two notions require a double-sided consideration:

- 1) Theory of language and general linguistics are fields that constitute the general framework of all linguistic disciplines. Therefore, we must start from a very deep level of abstract thought so that we can fully clarify what specifically constitutes their object.
- 2) On the other hand, it is an accepted philosophical fact that all sciences—whether they are natural, cultural, or auxiliary— have elaborated their methods adapting them to their specific object of investigation, to what has been called their formal object, at least since Aristotelian medieval Scholastics. As a consequence, a particular conception of the object of study necessarily implies a specific methodology, different from any other and required by a distinct conception of the same object of investigation.

The concept of theory of language expounded so many times at the Romance Seminar of Tübingen University by Prof. Eugenio Coseriu (†) is not part of historical languages but rather a part of the philosophy of science. This would describe and define the place of the study of

² Please notice that the title of this series is precisely: *Lorenzo Hervás. Fundamentos del Lenguaje. Foundations of Language, Fondements du Langage. Sprachgrundlagen.*

historical languages within the scope of scientific activities. Consequently, historical languages are not the object of study of theory of language; on the contrary, that object can be found at a deeper level of investigation, just before studying the descriptions of the specific historical languages.

Unlike this conception, Th. Lewandovski ((1985, 4., neu bearbeitete Aufl.) p. 1012 and thereafter), defines linguistic theory as: „eine über die Grammatiktheorie nicht nur additiv hinausgehende Theoriebildung, die allgemeine anthropologische, soziologische, psychologische, sprachverwendungs- und handlungsorientierte, synchrone und diachrone sowie allgemeine wissenschaftstheoretische Komponenten zu integrieren hat"³.

If this descriptive definition, whose literalness we have chosen to maintain, were to be accepted, then one should conclude, as has been done repeatedly, that in fact no theory of language exists, nor could it possibly exist. The practical reason for this must be found in the researchers' zeal to invade a scientific field wider than what is attainable or desirable, or in not having distinguished what in Europe has been clear since G. B. Vico, namely the division of sciences into natural

³ "A theoretical formation that goes beyond the theory of grammar not only in an additive manner, given that it has to integrate general anthropological, sociological, and psychological components, as well as those of linguistic use and those oriented to action both synchronic and diachronic, along with general components of the theory of science."

sciences, cultural sciences and sciences of formalization. In fact, stating the limits of theory of language as opposed to the other sciences cannot be the formal object of study of linguistics but instead of the philosophy of science.

This point was ignored by A. N. Chomsky ((1957), p. 49) as he stated that "A grammar of language L is essentially a theory of language L" (cf. V. Báez San José (1973), § 3.0.), that is, the then-young M.I.T. Ph. D. regarded the cultural as natural. He thus took a definitive step towards natural sciences, since the observed aspects were not explained within a freely-stated field but one ruled by a set of laws and restrictions. This implied taking L. Bloomfield's theory (1933) to its furthest consequences since he had adopted the psychological framework of Watson's behaviorism and rejected everything which was not "directly observable" for linguistic analysis. Therefore, within the study of language, the semantic aspect was considered a useful intuition even though it could not be scientifically studied. Given that, if speaking is not communicating with someone intentionally in an articulate manner, one must also reject, along with L. Bloomfield and his followers, the essential aspects of communication within linguistics. These are: meaning, sense (the combination of non-contradictory meanings) and reference (not only of nouns and proforms⁴ but

⁴ Manuals talk about "reference" only and exclusively when they know for sure that nouns and pronouns relate to objects in an extra-linguistic reality. From our point of

principally of sentence structures patterns, utterances and, naturally, of their corresponding speech acts to the phenomena understood as facts in whose manifestation our speaking ability, that is, our ability to communicate with someone intentionally in an articulate manner, is exhausted).

The dichotomy theory of language / general linguistics must also not be connected with the one established by F. de Saussure, *langue* / *parole*. More than thirty years ago, Báez San José (1975,p.24), in agreement with the Polish linguist Witold Manczak (1969), stated that the difference between *langue* and *parole* was primarily quantitative and that the qualitative differences stated by Saussure should not be admitted, nor should those established by Chomsky. Saussure considers the so-called *langue* only and exclusively as a system of signs whose realizations are the strings of *parole*. This is merely a brilliant term accepted by most linguists for between this theoretical concept and praxis there is a contradiction which could be exemplified as follows: Botany studies plants but not Mendel's laws. Only linguistics would study a supposed theoretical object, a system of abstract signs, but really, unlike what Saussure suggests, it deals with texts and their

view, reference truly exists when what is conceived as an event (real, possible or impossible), that is, when a sentence structure pattern, realized as an utterance, becomes a speech act. See Valerio Báez San José (1987, 1990–1991, 1991, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2005) and Valerio Báez San José, Guillermo Fernández Rodríguez–Escalona and Marciana Loma–Osorio Fontecha (2008).

understanding, as will be seen shortly. Saussure's position is in itself a contradiction and follows, according to Manczac, the antinomies of mutability/immutability, grammar/vocabulary, synchrony/diachrony, *langue/parole*– that is, a dualist primitive way of thinking. Just as for a physicist there are not two different realities heat–cold, light–darkness, humidity–dryness, speed–slowness, etc., there cannot really be two different realities for a linguist. All scientific progress is a transition from dualism to monism (for instance, the theory of relativity that reduces space, time, mass and energy to a same denominator).

Finally, we believe that a linguist should explain the fact that somebody communicates with someone else intentionally in an articulate manner and this other person/oneself can understand him/her, at least partially. This is the reason why we call our linguistic theory "From Speaking to Linguistic Systems" ("*Desde el Hablar a las Lenguas*"). However, building a linguistics of the real linguistic competence of a historical community is, logically, a subsequent activity to knowing what the place of linguistics is, as opposed to other sciences, within a general theory of science.

We do not state that the so-called "theory of language" is a more abstract term that includes partial theories, syntax theory, semantic theory, phonological theory, etc. We do not here defend that the essential components of theory of language are linguistic description, linguistic change, language acquisition (L1, L2,... etc.), linguistic

functions etc. As will be explained throughout our future articles, all this confusion comes from the non-distinction between speaking (*el hablar*) and linguistic systems.

On the other hand, if theory of language were the integration of several partial theories into a comprehensive one, one would first have to make clear the criteria adopted for the integration, and also state the essential reasons why theory of language should be considered a discipline distinct from others.

As well as theory of language, we must also consider the concept of general linguistics. The latter is necessarily intra-linguistic, i.e. once we know the essentials of linguistic systems and their realizations through linguistic theory and the possible levels of linguistic research, if we compare them among themselves, we can inductively make generalizations or even foresee units and universal relationships as hypotheses. Fundamentally, we intend to recognize the science designed by Georg von der Gabelentz in the 19th century and apply to it the principles of inductive study designed by J. M. Bochensky in the 20th century.

This problem we are posing again has already got a tradition within the history of the theory which we are dealing with. In fact, V. Báez San José (1975, pp. 152–154), interpreting several generativist studies, stated: 1) J. J. Katz (1967, pp. 126–127), then an interpretative semanticist, described the theory of the existence of linguistic universals in the

following way: a) organizational universals, which determine the abstract structure of the subcomponents of the grammatical description and the relationships among them; b) universals which determine the abstract formal structure of the types of rules of each subcomponent of a grammar, and c) substantive universals, which specify the theoretical vocabulary which provides the elements (constructs) for the formation of specific rules that might show the formal structure required by formal universals.

2) how in other authors more or less framed within generativism it was theoretically upheld:

A) J. Lyons (1966): noun, predicate and sentence can be classified as universals while other features and categories are different in all languages,

B) E. Bach (1965): there is a universal set of transformations that each language carries out in a different way,

C) M. A. K. Halliday (1966): the universal deep structure is a linguistic universal,

D) Ch. J. Fillmore (1968): there is a universal system of semantic cases which determine the deep structure of any natural language, and finally

E) E. Bach (1968): nouns, adjectives and verbs, which could be considered natural categories within the generativist terminology, are identical in the deep structures of all languages.

All this presupposed, even though at the time it was not so clear to

scholars, a confusion between theory of language and general linguistics. One of our first attempts to solve this problem was a return to the medieval Scholastics. According to this school, there was an *ante rem* universal which was the essence of the thing itself or, from a Platonic perspective, the absolute reality of the ideal being. The *in re* universal referred to the set of real characteristics of real things (*res*); and the *post rem* universal was the set of properties which the researcher inductively drew from abstractions, starting from the phenomenon of reality. All this is even clearer in the Spanish Renaissance Scholastics. When Melchor Cano (1563, 1–9, c.7) states precisely:

Res sunt singulares, ideae vero rerum sunt essentialiter universales; res sunt contingentes, mutabiles, transitoriae; ideae autem sunt necessariae, inmutabiles, aeternae; res sunt concretae et determinatae quoad omnes suas circumstantias, ideae vero sunt abstractae et a circumstantiis praescindunt.

The concept of theory of language is present here since trying to delimit it in relation to other sciences is nothing but some way delimiting, not defining, *ante rem* universals. According to the Scholastic's thesis:

Universale formale fit per operationem intellectus; et quidem universale formale directum per meram praecisionem mentis; formale logicum vel relativum per comparisonem reflexivam naturae abstractae cum individuis.

It is clear from this that the concept of theory of language comes

from the formal universal and the direct formal universal. On the other hand, the concept of general linguistics, as Georg von der Gabelentz has clearly stated, emerges from a logical or relative formal method if we make abstract comparisons with the elements.

It is curious to see how J. M. Bochensky (1965, p. 92) has proposed a method analogous to the Scholastics', a deductive-inductive method of discernment, scientific, empirical, exact and objective, in four steps:

- 1) observation of the data (the empirical step),
- 2) involved analysis of the structure of the data (the intelligence step), not mechanical, intuitive, based on the data but helped by the foundations, formation and intelligence of the analyst, who is able to generalize, compare and identify the regularities in the data collected if there are enough of them to be analyzed,
- 3) formulation of a hypothesis (exact step in which the results of the discovery made when we get deeper into the data are formulated in an exact way, according to a given theory which provides new terms and general modes), and
- 4) verification of the hypothesis (objective step consisting of a mechanical checking in which the results should be independent from the subjective stance of the analyst and verifiable by another analyst using the same data and methods).

As a conclusion, theory of language is one that, in accordance with point 3), provides universal and general terms and modes, whereas general

linguistics could be defined as the formulation of a hypothesis in accordance with induced data and the verification of this hypothesis. In fact, we are dealing with the construction of two different mechanisms: theory of language, a deductive mechanism; and general linguistics, an inductive mechanism that leads to a verified hypothesis.

2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLE.

2.1. NATURAL SCIENCES AND CULTURAL SCIENCES.

From the point of view of the philosophy of science, we can divide the set of human scientific knowledge, as G.B. Vico's cyclic conception did – shown currently within the field of language sciences by E. Coseriu (1968)– into three main groups: natural, auxiliary and cultural sciences. The basis of this distinction is the following:

1) In natural sciences, the material object of investigation, or at least the primary elements that necessarily constitute this object, preexists, that is, it has not been created by man. He just strives to explain it formally by means of the general principle of causality, i.e. the search ends when the necessary cause of the explained phenomenon is found. Consequently, all natural science is necessarily predictive.

That is the reason why all the generativist⁵, postgenerativist and cognitive efforts to make a predictive grammar were and still are *ab ovo* failing. Both generativists and postgenerativists have not taken into account that, when there is freedom, there could be an opposite system but not a law of cause and effect and vice versa; a predictive model, identical to the one supported by the historicists in the 19th century, who, after creating phonetic laws, also forgot about the aforementioned model, up to the present. Thus we can say, explaining, yes, prophesying, obviously not. We agree with predictivity, if being predictive implies a theory of language whose objective would be the formulation of a series of hypotheses that account for the universal and general features that languages and their manifestation, speaking (*e/ hablar*), may have. We must then test if these components and universal and/or general elements correspond to the real data collected. Otherwise, we should reformulate new hypotheses which incorporate the results not clearly foreseen in the first hypothesis. This is a hypothetical–deductive working method. We must also take into account that the series of initial hypotheses cannot by themselves account for the way “speaking” works here and now but rather for the whole system

5 See Valerio Báez San José (1975), where the author points out that what is called “generative grammar” was originally just a simple theory about the formal description of a language. The founders and followers of this theory have 1. Added some components, or 2. Varied their order, or 3. Both 1 and 2 at the same time.

constructed to explain these current data which, as free cultural products, undergo the creative transformation by the speaker.

In natural sciences there is no place for human freedom since a given phenomenon occurs as a consequence of a sufficient cause and there is no other one that may counteract it. Natural sciences are consequently sciences of the necessary. The pertinent features of these fields of scientific investigation are: a) the preexistence of the object itself, or as a previous element; and b) its causal explanation.

2) On the contrary, in auxiliary sciences or rather formal sciences, mathematics and logic, the phenomenological object does not preexist, either in whole or in part. Actually, numbers, variables, magnitudes, points, lines etc. do not have a prior existence except as the researcher's *a priori* elements or structures. Furthermore, what is based on the above-mentioned *a priori* elements or structures follows a set of rules which completely fulfill the principles of all scientific knowledge: the principles of identity and non-contradiction. As a consequence, there is no material object for these sciences, and the explanation consists of the inner creation of the simple or complex object, which must be ruled by necessary principles. It must be considered, on the other hand, that all scientific investigation of a natural or cultural object should be explained either mathematically or logically or mathematically and logically. We must remember that the mathematical or the logical object does not exist by itself. Nonetheless, the formalized explanation of any scientific object

cannot be contradictory logically and/or mathematically.

3) In cultural sciences, we find objects which are radically different. Indeed, a cultural fact exists prior to any investigation but in a free and voluntary way. If we relate some specific elements in the appropriate proportions and adequate conditions, a determined caused effect cannot be guaranteed to be obtained.

2.2. AN ATTEMPT TO FIND THE FOUNDATIONS OF CULTURAL SCIENCES.

Our conception of cultural sciences ultimately comes from G. B. Vico, nonetheless, our mentor has been W. Dilthey. In fact, since the latter integrated all the experiences and processes of human comprehension—including sciences, which all have the same origin— he could focus on the development of the differences between the so-called natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*) and cultural sciences or "sciences of the spirit" (*Geisteswissenschaften*), these latter few being historically oriented. A basic point of Dilthey's position is that natural sciences explain processes (*Vorgänge*) which exist in nature, whereas cultural sciences try to understand (*verstehen*) historical-cultural events. It implies that the concept of understanding involves experiencing in oneself, at the same time, another's and one's own being, *Dasein*, as it is expressed in writing, languages, gestures, mimicking, art, etc. and, evidently in speaking (*das Sprechen*). This understanding is not carried out passively by simply using symbols. It demands an active experience.

The late Dilthey formulated (1910) another outline for the explanation of "sciences of the spirit" (*Geisteswissenschaften*): experiencing, understanding, expressing. The normal difference between natural and cultural sciences attributed to our author is the following:

NATURAL SCIENCES: EXPLAINING	SCIENCES OF THE SPIRIT: UNDERSTANDING
THE OBJECT IS NATURE. THIS IS THE ONLY ONE THAT CAN BE INVESTIGATED AND OBSERVED. SUPPOSITIONS ABOUT THE CAUSE OF NATURAL PROCESSES ARE FORMULATED. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO REPEAT THE EXPERIENCE (<i>Nach-Erleben</i>).	THE OBJECT IS THE PRODUCTS OF HUMAN SPIRIT. THESE CAN BE UNDERSTOOD SINCE MAN HIMSELF HAS CREATED THEM.
NATURAL PROCESSES ARE CONCEIVED AS SPECIAL CASES OF A GENERAL ABSTRACT LAW.	THE OBJECTS OF INVESTIGATION OF "SCIENCES OF THE SPIRIT" ARE CONCEIVED IN THEIR RELATIONSHIPS TO EACH OTHER ⁶ .
THE SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING OF "THE NATURAL" IS NEUTRAL WITH REGARD TO ITS OBJECT OF INVESTIGATION AND HAS LITTLE IMPORTANCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY.	THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE EXISTENCE (<i>DASEIN</i>) OF DIFFERENT PAST CULTURES AND PERSONALITIES LEADS TO ONE'S TRANSFORMATION. THE OTHER'S SPIRITUAL CONTENTS ARE INTEGRATED IN ONE'S OWN'S SPIRITUAL CONTENTS IN AN ACTIVE WAY.
AN EXPLANATION WITHIN THE FIELD OF NATURAL SCIENCES IS VERIFIABLE.	THE KNOWLEDGE OF "SCIENCES OF THE SPIRIT" CANNOT BE VERIFIED. IN CASE WE COULD ENTIRELY UNDERSTAND SOMETHING CULTURAL, IT WOULD BE PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO BE ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN ABOUT THE FULL NATURE OF SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING.

6 Here we find a well-foreseen concept of opposition.

As has already been mentioned, Dilthey aligns himself with the hermeneutic tradition of Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher. In fact, Schleiermacher was the first one to free hermeneutics (see Frank, M., ed., 1977, and principally F. Schleiermacher, 2000) from the mere *Method for Interpretation of Text* and to leave it generally open to the field of understanding. In this way Dilthey developed the viewpoint in which it is not only the word itself that finds meaning in relation to the text, but the discourse/reasoning, the literary genre, the division into chapters, ... must also be taken into consideration. According to Dilthey, this expansion is necessarily extended to all expressions of human life (*Lebensäußerungen*). Consequently, the meaning of a cultural phenomenon will always depend on the context and can never be absolute. Human gestures, works of art, architectural styles, laws, order, rules, and religious conceptions can only be understood within a sense relationship (*Sinnzusammenhang*).

It is precisely at this point where the conception of those who know directly or indirectly Dilthey's thought and our own perspective start differing. For most semanticists, who call themselves functionalists, without previously defining, apart from some exceptions, what a "function" is, "sense" is an intuition of the whole⁷. As far as we

7 In the last 6th International Congress on Hispanic Linguistics held for the last time at Leipzig University by the great Hispanist Prof. Dr. Gerd Wotjak in the / *Institut für Sprach- und Übersetzungswissenschaft*, 8–12 October 2003, 1. The first author of this article stated in a public session that the so-called textual linguistics of a functionalist

are concerned– taking into account that sense necessarily implies a determined context– “sense” in a text could be defined as the product of a non-contradictory combination of the categorial, lexical and, eventually, grammatical meanings which are undertaken in a discourse, whose product is the text itself (see the discussion on these three terms in V. Báez San José, 2002, chp. 3.2., pp. 56–60). This has to be so because the only thing a human mind cannot understand, as we see it, is something contradictory in itself. We cannot clearly state that an intuition of the whole may or even could arise. On the contrary, this intuition of the whole is only understandable and adequate insofar far as it is exactly compatible with the non-contradictory combination of the elements of the different communicative levels.

On the other hand, this call to intuition by the idealists with a solid philosophical background such as K. Vossler and L. Spitzer, or even by Dámaso Alonso (see : V. Báez San José, 1972, and the review by Leo Spitzer, 1952 to Dámaso Alonso, *Poesía Española...*) was just the non-formalized understanding of the aforementioned combination.

Consequently, the issue of what is called the “circle of understanding” (*Hermeneutischer Zirkel*) stops having, as we see it, a

tendency was presented as linguistics of sense. 2. He also stated clearly that he had not found a single sufficient definition of the term, if we understand by “sufficient” the definition made according to a criterion of a *close genus and differentia*. 3. It was asked of the present linguists an approach to arrive at the required definition. There was no answer.

merely intuitive value. In fact, if, after a non-scientific audition or a reading, the whole is conceived as something intuitive and the particular as something understandable by its relationship with that whole, then we presuppose and pre-admit that the whole is previously known and, furthermore, that the knowledge of the specific elements comes from the whole itself, and, finally, that the understanding of it depends on the particular aspects integrated in a unit. Dilthey sorted out this problem saying that all current knowledge lies on a prior knowledge (*Vorverständnis*). Sense structures for Dilthey are relationships situated ahead of the isolated elements. This thought is clearly expressed by this author in his famous formula: *daß das Denken nicht hinter das Leben zurückgehen kann (Thought cannot go behind life)*.

We agree with Dilthey that raw data (*Rohdaten*), which are primary data absolutely free from any pre-interpretation, cannot be found either in natural sciences or in cultural sciences. In fact, from the classic Greek thought, each first observation and choice of the objects of natural and cultural sciences lies, implicitly or explicitly, on a pre-knowledge of things. On the other hand, all meaning is a set of features historically gathered as part of a whole. Nonetheless, constructions which we call terminological constructions within natural sciences or cultural constructions are both syntagmatic combinations. Consequently, we must not confuse "sense" with the system of elements at a specific level of description nor can we confuse "sense" with a globalizing intuition.

Initially, Dilthey considered life-shaping experience (*erleben*) as the foundation of hermeneutics and understanding (*verstehen*) as the psychological concerned penetration into an author's mental processes. Later he abandoned this psychological point of view and focused on the concepts of "expression" and "understanding" as the main focus of cultural sciences methodology, whose main purpose would be to clarify the relationship between experiencing (*erleben*), expressing (*Ausdruck*) and understanding (*verstehen*). In this process, the expression, or rather the objectivation of the general spirit (*Geist*) of an age should be considered as a manifestation of the vital impulses of some author(s) or artist(s).

In other words, the circle of understanding (*Das Zirkel im Verstehen*) implies: 1) The formation of preconceptions or anticipations (*Vorurteilen, Vorwegnahmen*), that is, anticipatory interpretations of the meaning of a text or a piece of that text. 2) The subsequent elaboration of an idea on the text or on part of it, a process which may lead to the change of the first preconceptions, following these steps: a) the hermeneutic draft: the blending of the horizon of understanding and the horizon of meaning, b) the hermeneutic experience: the pre-conception is developed and corrected, c) the final draft is improved: deeper understanding and elaboration of the pre-knowledge. This process can be repeated *ad infinitum*.

2.3. CIRCLE OF UNDERSTANDING AND WORLDVIEW.

Closely connected to the process of the hermeneutic circle is the concept of *Weltanschauung* (Worldview), which has been often connected to W. von Humboldt's thought. However, we have never explicitly found such a connection. It seems to have been documented first in I. Kant (1790, Part I, Book II, (§ 26)), where the main topic is founding the aesthetic feeling. The analysis of the sublime means that worldview, which is an absolute general term, is the capacity to bring an aesthetic-receptive vision into the ordinary world. This perspective is an endless multifaceted phenomenon, but this process of conceptual transformation does not coincide in Kant with any decisive systematic meaning.

German Romanticism used this idea as a weapon against the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Gradually subjective feeling became a focus of interest: one's personal perspective of the world was a summation not only of comprehensive rational knowledge but also of experience and feelings.

Schleiermacher stated in 1813 in *Vorlesungen über Pädagogik*: „Es ist die Weltanschauung eines jeden, worin die Totalität aller Eindrücke zu einem vollständigen Ganzen des Bewusstseins bis auf den höchsten Punkt gesteigert, [...] gedacht wird.“ [What one thinks is each person's worldview, in which the totality of all impressions is intensified towards

a whole consciousness till the summit is reached]. Consequently, worldview is not just a mere subjective, speculative opinion of the world. It presupposes a path of progressive personal integration of knowledge, natural science and science of history, and also the highest independent activity of the human spirit, whose aim is a coherent whole. The evident consequences of insufficient comprehension and familiarity with this concept are the following: 1) schools such as generativism would not have suffered from the useless hypertrophy that is denounced today even by its former strict followers, 2) other orientations in vogue, such as what is called cognitive linguistics, which were even before *in nuce* included in the thought of the *Sprachphilosophie*, of Phenomenology, etc., 3) according to the first Prague School, any linguistic structure–personal or social– in a language is originally a metaphor, consequently it is a psychological–aesthetic object which could be either social or individual.

In the theory of knowledge drafted by Martin Heidegger (mainly in 1927/2006) the hermeneutic circle is presented as the starting point to be able to understand the sense relationships in the world. Furthermore, this philosopher intended on establishing it in an ontogenetic manner. The beginning of the hermeneutic circle is based on a basic, primary and original evidence of the truth. In fact, since man has been exactly in the truth of his being, he can pose the question about the truth of the meaning of the “human being” and expand on it later on.

According to this, each statement (*Aussage*) uttered by an individual implies a hermeneutic circle for himself, inasmuch as such a statement contains truth as much as knowledge, that is, the truth cannot be questioned, since it already has the truth. As a consequence, in order to be able to understand the sense relationship in the world, a hermeneutic circle must be completed so that a better understanding can be drawn. The movement of this circle takes place in such a way that the particular can only be understood in relation to the whole, and the whole itself can only be shown in the particular/individual. Nonetheless, if the understanding process is only feasible within the conduit of a circle, then it is really a problem to know where that circle must be founded. Heidegger's solution to this problem is man himself since it is he who poses the question of the meaning of "being".

The "being" of man/human being is conceived and named by Heidegger "being-there" (*Dasein*, also translated very often as "being in the world"), which can only be understood not as a subject-object relationship but as the relationship existing between our own existence and temporality. This relationship starts as a pre-knowledge of being pointed out as knowledge of being (*Seinsverständnis*). This latter knowledge is incumbent on any human being when he understands, for instance, the different types of being, inanimate objects, animals, etc. These obvious (*selbstverständlich*) behaviours are based on interpretations of the "how" and "what" of things.

This basic and essential characteristic is related to the "being there" (*Dasein*). This is why the human being is constantly involved in a pre-reflexive horizon of understanding, consequently, Heidegger focuses his intellectual work on the concept of "being there". Through this perspective, obviously hermeneutic, Heidegger does not refer to a subject who mainly perceives bodies in space and time (as Kant does, for instance). The "being there" is even more than that, a "being there" who understands, who is permanently integrated in a world.

What makes Heidegger's thought particularly interesting for the founding of cultural sciences in general and of speaking (*el hablar*) in particular, is that our author chooses not a special "being there" but an ordinary one as an access point to the circle. His objective is to rescue philosophy from its transcending speculations to the ordinary/usual world of experience.

This is why in Heidegger's conception, which is very close to Husserl's phenomenology, the following steps can be found:

- 1) A first step: how can the "being there" (*Dasein*) face the sense relationships in the world? This question, naturally, has as its consequence a phenomenological description.
- 2) In a second step, there is an existential analysis of the "being there", that is, investigations of the structures that form the "being there", such as languages, mood (situation), understanding and finitude of the "being there".

2.4. CULTURAL PHENOMENON AND SYMBOL.

The cultural phenomenon is symbolic and as such, phylogenetically individual, even though it may also become social. Even in that case, its degree of sociability, as with a symbol, depends on the social acceptance, i. e. on individual acceptances of such a phenomenon, and it could be shown at the most as something assumed by a sum of individual freedoms within a specific period of time.

We will not discuss either the different types of symbol, or the Saussurean distinction regarding the difference between sign and symbol in which the latter would refer to the non-purely conventional sign. This idea goes against the North American semiotic philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce's conception (see Christian J. W. Kloesel, Peirce edition project 1992), for whom a symbol would be, unlike an index or icon, a purely conventional sign. As far as we are concerned, we follow Ernst Cassirer's ideas: man is by definition a symbolic animal in the sense that he is essentially both a creator and user of symbols. According to this German philosopher, man only has relationships with reality through symbols, the contents of which are at the same time conscious and unconscious, social and individual for the person who uses them, just as psychoanalysis supported. So far we can state that

- 1) all knowledge, scientific or not, uses symbols,

2) when these symbols are linguistic, that is, linguistic signs, then, unlike Saussure (see Rudolf Engler, ed., 1968–74, Ferdinand de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale*), we have been stating for many years that the only linguistic sign is the syntactic–semantic sentence structure pattern. As we will see in other future articles, these are structures made up of 1) predicative nucleus; 2) eventually, some linguistic variables such as somebody, something, somehow, somewhere, at some point, some time, etc. and 3) eventually, some prepositions. These structures are semantically opposed to the other possible syntactic structures (either to those which have the same lexical meaning in the predicative nucleus or to those with a different lexical predicative nucleus).

All the other units which are also called linguistic signs are either determiners of all these structures lexically invested or not, or determiners of parts of them, that is, subsequent determiners of the syntagmas that comprise the sentence structure pattern and/or the utterance.

Since the syntactic–semantic patterns, which are simultaneously units of language and speaking (*das Sprechen*), are themselves intralinguistic units, we humbly believe that we are continuing Wilhelm von Humboldt's, Martin Heidegger's, Ernst Cassirer's or Hans-Georg Gadamer's theories. For the aforementioned authors, what in our theory would be called "speaking" as a means of communicating with someone

intentionally in an articulate manner according to a system– would be the means to think as well as the way to understand and interpret the world par excellence. This idea, close to the one presented by W. von Humboldt, takes as its origin the fact that language is essential for all the other more complex activities as well as for man's reflective processes (*Denkvorgänge*). Speaking is not an additional and subsequent means for understanding between human beings. Furthermore, the conception of things and the world's phenomena is already linguistically pre-structured in the speaker's mind. Things and phenomena (*Sachverhalte*) relate to each other through the linguistic conception of the world by means of meaningful relationships (*Sinnzusammenhänge*), without which no other orientation in the world would be possible for man. Consequently, he does not live as an animal in a world conceived sensitively (*sinnlich*) in which he makes himself understood subsequently, sporadically and occasionally by means of speaking. He lives and exists in speaking itself. What makes him a human being is the fact that he always puts things in a linguistic relationship. This focus or approach primarily goes against the conception of language as a mere tool for communication.

We are facing a historical phenomenon, and as such, unconcluded, and as such, relative, and, consequently modifiable⁸. Does this imply that

⁸ There are no classical languages, as already stated by José Ortega y Gasset (1940) when he held literally that we need a new type of reflection on the Greek and the

the explanation of a cultural phenomenon must be historical? It would be a contradiction to say that the historical explains itself. The explanation of a cultural phenomenon implies the identification of the forms through which it is expressed and the search for the contents of consciousness associated with such forms. This means that, unlike natural phenomena, in which cause and effect occur "outside" the researcher and the cause comes before the effect and explains it, in a logical or mathematical phenomenon, the elements and construction are "inside" the researcher and the derived structure is logically subsequent to what it stems from. Finally, in the field of cultural phenomena, the researcher is situated simultaneously "inside" and "outside", that is, what the symbol means and the form which means it. The explanation cannot be causal, deductive or inductive but, necessarily, opposite, i.e. a hypothesis must be formulated so as to determine which contents of consciousness are associated with one form versus the ones associated with the others. Nothing before, either temporal or logical, explains what comes later logically or temporarily, since between what comes before and what comes after is human freedom, essential to the cultural phenomenon.

Regardless of the fact that a historical fact cannot be studied historically, as this would imply a contradiction, all knowledge is historical

Roman thought, not as models, but on the contrary, as examples of errors. Man is a historical being and each historical reality– consequently not definitive– is mainly an error. Being historically conscious of oneself and learning to see oneself as an error is exactly the same thing.

in one way or another. In a cultural science, like the one we are analyzing, given the phenomenological complexity of the analyzed object, the human being, it is essential to pose the problem of the numerous explanations all along history that man has given himself about himself⁹, i.e. on the products of his free intentional and voluntary activity. Hence the historical principle.

3. THE HISTORICAL PRINCIPLE.

Ever since Hegel, it is known that all knowledge is historical, and consequently, that the history of theory of language and of general linguistics (as previous and underlying studies) is also historical. This, of course, is if both of them are conceived as sets of organized knowledge which present the theories and methods that, in a dialectic opposition, have tried to explain the set of peculiar phenomena constituting historical languages in their many varieties and manifestations.

Indeed, Hegel, in his *Vorlesungen über die Weltgeschichte* (1805/06) considers history as a progressive advance in the conscious knowledge of freedom (*Fortschritt im Bewußtsein der Freiheit*). He considers world history as the most concrete reality of the spirit (*konkreteste Wirklichkeit des Geistes*) or, eventually, as a representation of the spirit (*Darstellung des Geistes*), that is, how we get to know what

⁹ In a Kantian terminology, so to say, we are now dealing with an imperative of pure practical reason.

we really are ourselves (according to the philosopher from Stuttgart, this type of progress is absolutely necessary).

After this, two great paths of thought opened: 1) the so-called "scientific change of history", and 2) the comparison of phenomenological systems (see Cramer, 1984), that is, the history of cultural events. The former had a necessary character that history itself had taken upon itself to eliminate. The latter is the one that has been carried out in the best cultural tradition from Husserl to the present day.

That is the reason why, before showing our own perspective, which should take us from a theory of speaking (*Sprechtheorie*) to a specific speaking (individual speaking), we must explain our concept of the history of linguistic thought. It has become necessary to do so, since all researchers refer to one of these dialectic moments, as has been clearly stated by psychology, on one hand, and by the general study of symbolic forms, on the other. This latter research proves that these do not come out of nowhere nor does the scientific reflection on themselves.

3.1. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES.

The many aspects dealt with in the study of linguistic phenomena do not interfere with the establishment of some basic principles which have founded, in one way or another, all linguistic speculations – and also speculations about symbolic forms in general– from the first Sanskrit grammars to the most recent conceptions which consider speaking and its

products as aesthetic systems. These principles or basic aspects can be stated as a three-part consideration: 1) the linguistic phenomenon both in the act of its production and in the nature of the product itself, 2) the systems of units and their underlying rules for speaking and its products and 3) speaking as a faculty of man and so, methodologically, as the study of this faculty itself, its universally valid principles and rules.

This three-sided problem has not been dealt with theoretically until very recently, and so we consider a three-part scientific approach to speaking and languages/linguistic systems as pertinent:

- 1) a historical approach which, dialectically, sets clearly the way in which linguistic knowledge is developed in successive theses, antitheses and syntheses of methods, theories and schools;
- 2) a reflection on the theoretical concepts and methods of the three above-mentioned aspects, so that the elements that make a new comprehensive synthesis possible may be drafted; and,
- 3) the adaptation of these principles to a description of languages in their different historic forms under which we can find paradigmatic systems and syntagmatic rules that account for speaking itself in a dual perspective: synchrony, conceived as something immediate to consciousness, and diachrony, relation with other structures not immediate to the present consciousness of the speaker and/or researcher.

3.2. THE INSTRUMENTAL CHARACTER OF THE DICHOTOMY SYNCHRONY /DIACHRONY.

As far as synchrony and diachrony are concerned, we must insist once more that they are exclusively instrumental concepts since the speaking products themselves, as they are unique and unrepeatable, cannot be synchronic or diachronic– both synchrony and diachrony just refer to the researcher's perspective. That is, when he interprets a specific product, he can do it by either considering this product as one more within a series of products that have preceded it but have not caused it, or by trying to interpret it from his consciousness as a speaker or from his informants' consciousness of what he is using or may be using. Synchrony is not a system in a point in time because that point neither exists nor can exist. Diachrony is not the evolution of speaking because man cannot understand evolution itself, but only the comparison between states of consciousness from different periods of time. In any event, such comparison cannot be based on precise time delineations since the ontogenetic and phylogenetic states of consciousness are in continuous flux, as is the case with their creators, man and society. Consequently, and in complete agreement with the master from Tübingen, E. Coseriu, when we study a product of speaking we are researching an object individually elaborated, which does not have any systematic unity. Instead, corresponding to a state of things which relates to a variety or architecture of systems (E. Coseriu,

1970/73, p. 27), that is, to a diasystem that is split or divided into the spatial field (diatopic), the sociocultural (diastratic) and stylistic (diaphasic).

On the other hand, this last interpretative consciousness of the speaker (and the researcher) works synchronically but is formed both ontogenetically and phylogenetically in the diachrony of the individual and of society, i.e., in the change that both individual and society essentially imply.

Regardless of these considerations in which the opposition synchrony / diachrony is stated as a terminological category, not of the object of study but of the researcher's point of view, the current diachronic linguistics is far from achieving a theoretical status which may be sufficient. In fact, specialists of current diachronic linguistics, sometimes without knowing if they refer to the whole or to a part of it, present many different objects of study which do not form a coherent theory: phonetic change, lexical change, linguistic change, semantic change, syntactic change, analogical changes, linguistic classification, ecological linguistics, philology, history of language, areal linguistics, comparative method, models of linguistic change, linguistic prehistory, loan, inner reconstruction, linguistic reconstruction, genetic distance relationships, and so on.

3.3. DIALECTICS OF LINGUISTIC SPECULATION.

Today there are many treatises on the history of the scientific study of language in general and historical languages¹⁰ in particular, especially from ancient Greek speculation to the present time. On the other hand, there are very few of them that try to give any kind of unity to a historical study which is presented in many cases, more than as historical (*historisch* in the sense of Schleiermacher: producing effects of which one has cultural consciousness), that is, as an impetus for what comes later, rather than as something merely successive (*geschichtlich*: what comes first in time but without any causal or motivational link with it). This is the reason why we have gone back to Hegel who, as it is widely known, bases on his *Vorlesungen über die Weltgeschichte*¹¹ all specifically human evolution.

10 Although it is not necessary, at least in relative terms, we would like to state that neither the history of scientific study of language in general nor the history of the scientific study of historical languages is part of the synchronic or diachronic study of any language. Once again, we are looking at a matter of the philosophy of science.

11 V. Báez would like to thank his first teacher Prof. Emeritus Dr. D. Antonio Gómez Moriana (Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada), who, more than fifty years ago, knew how to awake an interest in the explanation of cultural phenomena, beyond just memorizing things, in a young person of the 1950's, in a village high school. Dr. Gómez Moriana taught his pupils how to study and pose problems. Later, V. Báez had the privilege and honor to study with him as his teacher again, in the fullest sense of the term in the Romance Languages Seminar of the Ruhr Universität, Bochum. By then, Professor Gómez Moriana, with two doctorates, was one of the most respected, admired and feared participants in that seminar. His work was the one of a titan: Atlas. During V. Báez's adolescence, Dr. Gómez Moriana introduced him to Hegelian philosophy and helped him understand the Spanish Renaissance and Baroque. Nothing was explained either in Spain, Italy or Germany which would improve upon his schemas or their content.

This is a dialectic conception which goes from what he calls the Eastern world to his time and runs on two dialectically opposed axes: idealism/realism. This conception has structured all our intellectual formation for more than a century. There is still no better explanation and, furthermore, it is still valid. Starting from this dialectic structure, we are now going to describe, in a totally schematic way, what is called the history of linguistic thought as an opposition between two main axes: the speculation about the essence of language and the speculation about its development, which are terms related to the above-mentioned axes (being and becoming).

In the Greek, Latin and medieval periods, the study of language was theoretically conceived as a descriptive general grammar. It tried to define its units within a logicist and philosophical framework leaving the historical phenomena aside. This linguistic description also had a practical, philological objective. Preeminence was given to the written text; consequently, the main objective was to transmit and interpret it correctly.

As opposed to this general perspective in ancient times and the Middle Ages, from the Renaissance to the 17th century, etymology, history of language and comparative grammar are dealt with for the first time in history. Initial approaches to the later called phonetic law as well as to substrate and language mixtures are made at this time as well.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, rationalism focuses again on the essence of language, since its study was conceived as a speculation

providing the foundation for a general descriptive grammar. This point of view was going to vary considerably in the 19th century due to the resurgence of an essentially historicist perspective. This viewpoint arises, on the one hand, from the philosophical conception of that century (positivism and historicism, the latter being immanent in the Hegelian dialectics) and on the other, from the discovery of other languages related to the European ones, such that gradually the relatedness and genealogy of Indo-European languages and other families of genetically associated languages¹² could be presented as a major achievement.

Diverging from these historicist trends, the 20th century returned to the essence of language in its two main aspects: general linguistics and descriptive linguistics.

We will focus now on the contemporary linguistic movements from the end of the 19th century to the present day. Once again, the opposition

12 In this last field, Lorenzo Hervás was the forerunner and most important representative: his linguistic works, with a deep ethnological, ethnographic and anthropological sense, improved upon all preceding works in vision and depth and were praised by Wilhelm von Humboldt, Johann Severin Vater and Johann Christoph Adelung, Max Müller and mainly, by Otto Jespersen. By all this, he was called the Father of Comparative Linguistics, after he announced: *"a language is a vision of the world or a vision of reality."* The establishment of the Indo-European family, the relationship between Greek and Sanskrit, the classification of Hebrew as a Semitic language, the scientific demonstration of Basque-Iberism, the establishment of two new language families: the Malayan-Polynesian and the Finnish-Hungarian, the importance given to grammar and morphology to decide the relatedness of languages (as Leibniz had already stated), the calling for direct data or linguistic data obtained by missionaries in the study of American Indian as well as Insulindian languages, all these place Lorenzo Hervás in front of most of his contemporaries, at least, for a century.

would be dialectic, between the terms analytic–synthetic.

If we consider the cultural cycle from Greek thought to the 18th century, we can define this long period as a syncretic age in language sciences. We can do so even though in some specific period speculation on the essence of language or its development may have predominated, analysis and synthesis were still two possible complementary research tendencies. Furthermore, the rationalist interest in the essence of language does not deny the historicist achievements of the historical thought of the Renaissance, nor does the latter's historicist worries question the utility and necessity of the theories on the nature/essence of language established by the ancients and the medievals. These periods can only be interpreted as successively emphasizing one problem or another.

With the historic positivism of the 19th century, an analytical stage of language sciences would develop through the first third of the 20th century. This analytical conception all along the 19th century is based on the positivist principle of the lack of distinction between natural and cultural phenomena. This implies that linguistic occurrences were explained experimentally on the basis of a causality principle; consequently there was an analytical and inductive conception which attempted to explain linguistic phenomena biologically, psychologically

and especially historically¹³, so that, as happens with natural occurrences, the procedure would be:

- 1) carry out a series of observations;
- 2) establish their general properties, and
- 3) state a series of characteristics as a general or even universal law, as long as the existence of other facts which demand a different characterization do not make a different hypothesis necessary.

As a consequence, a scientific relativism inherent to the study of natural phenomena was established as a guideline for the study of cultural occurrences, among which historical languages have a prominent position.

This positivist conception was going to be disrupted by the coming of European linguistic structuralism which, still within an analytical stage in the research of the linguistic phenomenon, was going to set the grounds for a contraposition to the previous stage, all in an anti-positivist and anti-historicist sense. Therefore, unlike 19th-century linguistics, 20th-century European structuralism and its later schools are determined by the following characteristics, as pointed out magnificently by E. Coseriu (1968): anti-historicism, anti-naturalism, systematicism and anti-substantialism.

A special mention should be made to generativism and post-

13 Historicity should be conceived as *geschichtlich* (material, successive, not interpretative) and not *historisch* (formal, not merely successive, interpretative).

generativism (see V. Báez San José, 1975, § 9.0. *Conclusiones*, pp. 298–320), especially what is called cognitive linguistics. Its followers, since they have never distinguished cultural and natural phenomena, are, to a certain extent, immersed in the 19th-century scientific philosophy. In this instance, though, they are not looking for a historical explanation of phenomena but are posing, at least in their more recent models, not the discovery of units and relationships but, strictly, pure and simple formalization, if we understand this as a principle of their explanation. The aforementioned researchers are, at best, syncretic, or what would commonly be called healthy eclecticism.

In fact, more recently, some dissatisfied generativist linguists of the 1980s such as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), Ronald Langacker (1987 and 1991), George Lakoff (1987), G. Fauconnier (1985/1994) and in collective works like Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.) (1988) and E. Casad (ed.) (1996), many of whom were followers of generative semantics (see V. Báez, 1973), did not criticize the validity of the generativist models, but rather their precariousness. This was because, as they stated, these models did not have the necessary means or resources. For this reason, in a new integrated model, cognitive grammar incorporated a series of extra-linguistic perspectives – linguistics + psychology, linguistics + anthropology, linguistics + neurology ..., or all of these together –. This cognitive grammar stated that, unlike the autonomous generative theory of language, the above–

mentioned sciences had something in common with linguistics: both of them agreed that language had two main cognitive capacities: categorization and the processes of metaphor and metonymy.

It is evident that these authors state that they work on hypotheses which are radically different from the ones of generative grammar but, at least as far as our own research from 1973 is concerned, we can state that we have never seen any difference between the two linguistic trends, transformational and cognitive grammar, but just the fact that the latter added some extra elements or considerations. In fact, some qualified psychologist psycholinguists call themselves cognitivists like the authors Michael Tomasello, Raymond Gibbs, Lera Boroditsky, Michael Ramscar, Michael Spivey, Seana Coulson, Teenie Matlock, Benjamin Bergen, Benjamín Alonso and Fernanda Alonso, on the one hand and David McNeill, on the other. There are also software engineers, such as Jerome Feldman, Terry Regier and Srinivas Narayanan. We can also find propaedeutic introductions to the cognitive grammar by Gilles Fauconnier, and other widely-quoted studies such as those by J. E. Grady, T. Oakley, y S. Coulson (1999), F. Ungerer and H. J. Schmid (1996/2006), G. Fauconnier (1997), J. R. Taylor (2002), W. Croft y D. A. Cruse (2004), M. Tomasello, M. (2003), E. Vyvyan Evans, Benjamin K. Bergen and J. Zinken (2007) and T. Rohrer (2007), all of whom add many different points of view.

In any event, the reading of these works, to which we could add

some other important Spanish authors such as M. J. Cuenca and J. Hilferty (1999), J. L. Cifuentes Honrubia (1994), C. Inchaurrealde and I. Vázquez (2000), A. Castañeda (1997) and A. López García (2004) only show the tendency to construct an integrating linguistics which, furthermore, already existed since the 18th-century and 19th-century German *Sprachphilosophie*. If not what would the Schleiermacher's theory of the circle of understanding, which has been developed in this article, be? Or, for that matter Karl Bühler's theory on the functions of speech (*Sprechfunktionen* and never *Sprachfunktionen*)? What would be the works of the Russian linguist R. Jakobson, cofounder of the Linguistic School of Prague, on metaphor, metonymy and generalization on linguistic learning masterfully presented in his work *Kindersprache und Aphasie*? They are an attempt at a synthesis, not a mere addition of parts. Jakobson begins by saying that speaking is the first metaphorical and/or metonymic and/or generalizing knowledge, and that consequently all speaking is poetic. Thus, being poetry at the level of the particular, it is also individual poetry accomplished with an instrument which is poetic at the social level.

It is true that the collapse of the strict boundary between science and humanities has been essential to unite researchers from both fields. They were as distant and uncomfortable with the other side as the citizens of Berlin were before the fall of the Wall. It is not enough to say that there is not any border; it has to be clearly stated that there are sciences, all of them logical, but divided into natural, cultural and

formalization sciences. All scientific progress moves from the plural to the singular in a new theory and this is precisely what we cannot see in cognitivists, since they consider, generally speaking, the formal object of the sciences to be an additive set of raw perspectives with no connection between them. From our point of view, somebody not able to differentiate may end in confusion.

We are, therefore, after the generativist brilliance—an inevitable corrective for having laid aside a millennium's philosophical tradition—standing before a stage which can again be called syncretic. In fact, we are before a theory which is conceived as coherent, even though no one or a very few may consider the validity of its principles, and it is called coherent because of its "polyhedral vision" of facts and analyses—, as many pretentious scholars currently assert. We have not yet seen that such analytical stances, called complementary because they mix different sciences, pose any of the following questions: 1) What is its place within the philosophy of science? 2) What is the most essential aspect of a combined treatment? 3) What is the reason for this treatment? and 4) How may a new science uniting these attempts emerge from them?

4. CONCLUSION.

Our methodological procedure has followed the path of the circle of understanding of the German hermeneutics: the first formalized perception was the 2002 model, its confrontation of the data from the

German, Spanish and English languages has been the revealing factor which has made us clarify our conception of particles and of temporal markers of discourse. On the eve of the publication of several works on the temporally and the logically prior – cause, condition, concession– and the subsequent –consequence– to the utterance, we have again posed the foundations of our practical research within the field of general linguistics. This linguistics is necessarily comparative, according to Georg von der Gabelentz's thought, which has given us, at this second beginning of the circle, a deeper perspective on the concepts of theoretical linguistics, general linguistics, philosophical principles and historical principles.

Theoretical linguistics is not a branch of linguistics but, as we have seen, part of the theory of science, gnoseology, which tells us where our research, according to its essence, is placed:

- A) within the field of cultural sciences
- B) within the field of symbolic elements,
- C) within the field of linear symbolic elements, and
- D) within certain systems composed of some units whose main core is the sentence structure pattern completed in meaning, sense and reference by other lesser possible levels:
 - i) that of universal paralinguistic sounds,
 - ii) that of systematic linguistic sounds which show different diaphasies, diastraties and diatopies,
 - iii) that of diasystematic linguistic sounds,

- iv) that of phonemes and glides as units which help to distinguish meanings,
- v) words as minimum syntagms, and
- vi) groups of words, possible units in many languages (pre-predicative syntagms, as the School of Prague already foresaw in the 1930s).

Starting from the speech event as the only true reality in historic speech, we face the problem that it may and does have a two-sided abstract treatment which may form dialectically, however, specific units: utterance and sentence structure patterns.

As far as speaking itself is concerned, the dialogue, a reality contained in the definition of speaking, communicating with someone intentionally in an articulate manner, we note that an utterance, in accordance with the unities that determine it, can be formed with interventions and these can also constitute a text. It must also be taken into account that utterance, intervention and text may coincide.

The philosophical principle has placed before our eyes: a) the aforementioned classification of sciences, b) Dilthey's original concept of a hermeneutic circle, with Schleiermacher's contributions and, principally, the often-quoted Heideggerian "*Dasein*" and c) out of the discussion of motivation/immotivation, conventionality/unconventionality of signs, we have focused on delimiting the most important linguistic sign: the sentence structure pattern. We have also focused on the emphasis given

by Ernst Cassirer to the fact that man is a symbolic animal in the sense that he is a never-ending creator of symbols, out of which the most important ones are the above-mentioned sentence structure patterns, as opposed to the existing ones in all possible semiotic systems.

Finally, incorporating Hegel's thought in his *Vorlesungen über die Weltgeschichte*, we have come to recognize that speculation about the essence of language continues to be part of our culture 1) from the Greek thought to the beginning of the 20th century we find a chain of theses and antitheses ruled by the opposition between pairs, speculation on the essence of languages /on their development and 2) a new branch of linguistic speculation arises since the end of the 20th century in Germany and later in France. It is ruled by the opposition between a) the 19th-century positivism characteristic of natural and cultural sciences, b) structuralism and its anti-historicist and anti-positivist principles, and from this, the alternation between inductive and deductive movements in accordance with the aforementioned Bochensky.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alonso, D. (1950): *Poesía española. Ensayo de métodos y límites estilísticos*, Madrid, Gredos.
- Bach, E. (1965): "On Some Recurrent Types of Transformations", *Monograph Series on Language and Linguistics*, 18, pp. 3-18.
- Bach, E. (1968): "Nouns and Noun Phrases", E. Bach y R. T. Harms (eds.):
-

Universals in Linguistic Theory, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 90–122

Báez San José, V. (1972, 2nd. ed.): *La estilística de Dámaso Alonso*. Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla.

——— (1975): *Introducción crítica a la gramática generativa*, Barcelona, Planeta.

——— (1987): "Oración y esquema oracional", LEA. Lingüística Española Actual, IX, pp. 65–82.

——— (1990–1991): "Oración y Esquema oracional", Homenaje al Prof. A. Holgado, Cádiz, Universidad de Cádiz, *Anales de la universidad de Cádiz*, 7–8, vol. I, pp. 69–86.

——— (1991): "Diátesis y esquemas sintáctico-semánticos. Sobre los fundamentos de la teoría de las voces de B. Pottier", Kemer, D. (ed.): XVIII Congreso Internacional de Filología Románica, Trier, Max Niemeyer Verlag, II, pp. 531–541.

——— (1993): "Funciones sintagmáticas y los niveles del acto de hablar, la expresión y el esquema oracional", Hilty, G. (ed.): XXe Congrès International de Linguistique et Philologie Romanes, Zürich (6–11 Avril 1992), Tübingen, Gunter Narr Verlag, tome I, Section I, *La Phrase*, pp. 71–84.

——— (1994): "Las formas en -mente en una teoría fenomenológica integrada del acto de hablar, la expresión y el esquema oracional", Lingüística Española Actual, XVI, pp. 1–45.

——— (1994): "De nuevo sobre funciones sintagmáticas en el acto de hablar, la expresión y el esquema oracional", *Verba. Anuario Galego de Filoloxía*. Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. Vol. 21, pp. 25–47.

——— (1994): "More about Syntagmatic Functions in Speech Act, Utterance and Sentence Pattern of Spanish", *LYNX. A Monographic Series in Linguistics and World Perception*. University of Minnesota and Universitat de Valencia. Vol. 4, pp. 67–96.

——— (1996): "Las formas en -mente en una teoría fenomenológica integrada del acto de hablar, la expresión y el esquema oracional", Gerd Wotjak (ed.): *En torno al adverbio español y los circunstanciales*. Tübingen, Gunter Narr

Verlag, Pp. 1–40.

- (1997) "Niveles desde una lingüística del hablar a una lingüística de las lenguas", II Congreso Nacional de Lingüística General, José Andrés de Molina Redondo y Juan de Dios Luque Durán (eds.), *Estudios de Lingüística General* (I). Conferencias presentadas en el II Congreso Nacional de Lingüística General. Granada, 25 al 27 de marzo de 1996. Departamento de Lingüística General y Teoría de la Literatura de la Universidad de Granada. Serie Collectae, pp. 1–22.
- (1998): "Un boceto de los esquemas sintactico-semánticos iniciales en español", Estudios de la Universidad de Cádiz ofrecidos a la memoria del Prof. Braulio Justel Calabozo. Universidad de Cádiz. Universidad de Cádiz. Servicio de Publicaciones. pp. 283–298.
- (2002): *Desde el hablar a la lengua. Prolegómenos a la sintaxis y semántica oracional y textual*. Con contribuciones de Pilar Garcés Gómez y Guillermo Fernández Rodríguez Escalona, Málaga, Editorial Ágora.
- (2003): "Aportaciones actuales a la teoría de los esquemas sintactico-semánticos: tradición y novedad", IV Congreso de Lingüística General, Cádiz del 3 al 6 de abril de 2000, Miguel Casas Gómez (ed.): Vol.: V Conferencia de clausura, Cádiz, pp. 11–78.
- (2005): "Una teoría desde el hablar a las lenguas para la comparación lingüística de las unidades significativas", Gerd Wotjak y Juan Cuartero Otal (eds.): *Entre semántica léxica, teoría del léxico y sintaxis*, Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, pp. 295–395. Studien zur romanischen Sprachwissenschaft und interkulturellen Kommunikation, Band 22.
- , Guillermo Fernández Rodríguez-Escalona y Marciana Loma-Osorio Fontecha (2008): "La determinación temporal del enunciado (1). Fundamentación teórica", *Lorenzo Hervás*. Documentos de Trabajo del Departamento de Humanidades 1: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. España. / Working Papers of the Department of Humanities 1: University Carlos III de Madrid. Spain. / Arbeitspapers der geisteswissenschaftlichen Abteilung. Carlos III de Madrid Universität. Spanien. / Documents de travail du Département des Sciences Humaines et Humanités 1. Université Carlos III de Madrid. Espagne, Serie
-

Lingüística, Número 6, Noviembre, 2008. http://e-archivo.uc3m.es/dspace/bitstream/10016/3123/1/LH_ling_n6.pdf

Bloomfield, L. (1933): *Language*. New York: Henry Holt

Bochensky, J. M. (1954): *Die zeitgenössischen Denkmethode*, München, Lehnen.

———— (1965): *The methods of contemporary thought*, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel

Chomsky, A. N. (1957): *Syntactic Structures*, London, The Hague, Paris.

Cano, M. (1563): *De locis theologicis libri duodecim*, preparada por F. VALDÉS, Salamanca, Biblioteca Universitaria de Salamanca, 44.553. Se utiliza en este trabajo la edición de I. SERRY, Padua 1714. Existe edición en español preparada por Juan Belda Plans, Madrid, BAC Maior, 2006.

Casad, E. H. (ed.) (1996): *Cognitive Linguistics in the Redwoods. The Expansion of a New Paradigm in Linguistics*, Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter.

Castañeda, A. (1997): *Aspectos cognitivos en el aprendizaje de una lengua extranjera*, Granada, Impredisur.

Cifuentes Honrubia, J. L. (1994): *Gramática cognitiva. Fundamentos críticos*, Madrid, Eudema.

Coseriu, E. (1968): *Einführung in die strukturelle Linguistik*. Vorlesung gehalten in Wintersemester 1967–68 an der Universität Tübingen. Autorisierte Nachschrift besorgt von G. Narr und R. W. Stuttgart.

———— (1970/73): *Einführung in die strukturelle Betrachtung des Wortschatzes*, (= TBL, 14) Tübingen.

Cramer, K. (1984): "Conciencia y autoconciencia en Hegel y Husserl", *Themata: Revista de Filosofía*, 3, pp. 7–18. Ponencia presentada en el las VI Jornadas Andaluzas de Filosofía, Sevilla, 24–28 de octubre 1984.

Croft, W. Y D. A. Cruse (2004) : *Cognitive Linguistics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Cuenca, M^a J. y Hilferty, J. (1999), *Introducción a la lingüística cognitiva*, Barcelona, Ariel.

Dilthey, W. (1910/2006): *Gesammelte Schriften, BAND 7: Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften*, Vandenhoeck &

Ruprecht, Göttingen.

Fauconnier, G. (1985/1994): *Mental Spaces*. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press.

——— (1997): *Mappings in Thought and Language*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

——— (1999): "Introduction to Methods and Generalizations", Janssen, Th., & Redeker, G. (eds.), *Cognitive Linguistics: Foundations, scope, and methodology. Cognitive Linguistic Research Series*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Version on line: http://cogweb.ucla.edu/Abstracts/Fauconnier_99.html

Fillmore, Ch. J. (1968): "The case for Case", E. Bach y R. T. Harms (eds.), *Universals in Linguistic Theory*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, pp. 1–88.

Frank, M. (ed.) (1977): *Hermeneutik und Kritik: mit einem Anhang sprachphilosophischer Texte Schleiermachers*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 211.

Grady, J. E., T. Oakley, y S. Coulson (1999): "Blending and Metaphor", G. Steen y R. Gibbs (eds.), *Metaphor in cognitive linguistics*, Philadelphia, John Benjamins. Versión on line: cogweb.ucla.edu/CogSci/Grady_99.html

Halliday, M. A. K. (1966): "Some Notes on Deep Grammar", *Journal of Linguistics*, II, pp. 57–67.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1919): *Vorlesungen über die Weltgeschichte*, neue Ausgabe, Herausgeber G. Lasson, Band 2, *Die orientalische Welt*, Leipzig, 11, Philosophische Bibliothek.

Heidegger, M. (1927/2006): *Sein und Zeit*, Niemeyer, Tübingen, 19ª ed.

Houser, N. et al (eds.): Peirce, Charles S. *The Essential Peirce*, 2 vols., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992–1998.

Inchaurrealde, C. y Vázquez, I. (2000): *Una introducción cognitiva al lenguaje y la lingüística*, Zaragoza, Mira.

Kant, I. (1790/2008): Otfried Höffe (ed.): *Immanuel Kant. Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Berlin, Akademie Verlag.

Katz, J. J. "Recent Issues in Semantic Theory", *Foundations of Language*, III, pp. 124–194.

- Lakoff, G. (1987): *Women, Fire, and dangerous Things*. University of Chicago Press.
- Lakoff, G. y M. Johnson (1980): *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago, University Of Chicago Press.
- Langacker, R. W. (1987): *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar*, Volume I, *Theoretical Prerequisites*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press.
- (1991): *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar*, Volume II, *Descriptive Application*, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press.
- Lewandowski, Th. (1985): *Linguistisches Wörterbuch*. Quelle & Meyer, Heidelberg, 4ª edición reelaborada.
- López García, A. (2004). «Aportaciones de las ciencias cognitivas». En Sánchez Lobato, J. y Santos Gargallo, I. (eds.), *Vademécum para la formación de profesores. Enseñar español como segunda lengua (L2) / lengua extranjera (LE)*, Madrid, SGEL, pp. 69–84.
- Lyons, J. (1966): "Towards a «Notional» Theory of «Parts of Speech»", *Journal of Linguistics*, II, pp. 209–236.
- Manczak, W (1969): "Les termes 'Langue' et 'Parole' designent-ils quelque chose du reel?", *Linguistics*, 55.
- Ortega y Gasset, J. (1937, 1983): "Miseria y esplendor de la traducción", *Obras completas*, Vol. V, Madrid, Alianza Editorial.
- Peirce, Ch. S. (1960–1966): *Collected Papers*, vols. 1–6, C. Hathorne y P. Weiss (eds.); vols. 7–8, A. W. Burks (ed.), London, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press.
- Peirce, Ch. S., Christian J. W. Kloesel, Nathan Houser, Peirce Edition Project (1992): *The Essential Peirce*, Indiana Univ Pr.
- Rohrer, T. (2007) "Enbodiment and experientialism", Dirk Geeraerts, H. Cuyckens (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp 25–47.
- Rudzka-Ostyn (ed.) (1988): *Topics in cognitive linguistics*, Amsterdam, John Benjamins.
- Saussure, F. de (1968 y 1974): *Cours de linguistique générale*, édition critique, Rudolf Engler (ed.), Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz.
-

Schleiermacher, F. (2000): *Sobre los diferentes métodos de traducir*. Traducción de Valentín García Yebra, Madrid, Editorial Gredos.

Spitzer, L. (1952): "Rezension: Dámaso Alonso, *Poesía española...*," *Romanische Forschungen*, LXIV, pp. 213–240.

Taylor, J. R. (2002): *Cognitive Grammar*. Oxford, Oxford University Press

Tomasello, M. (2003): *Constructing a Language. A Usage-Based Theory of language Acquisition*, Harvard University Press.

Ungerer, F. y Schmid, H. J. (1996/2006): *An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics*. New York, Longman, 2^a ed.

Vyvyan, E. Benjamin K. Bergen y Jörg Zinken (eds) (2007): *The Cognitive Linguistics Reader. (Advances in cognitive Linguistics)*, London, Equinox.